that include territorial integrity provisions offer blanket guarantees of signatories' territorial integrity, not just condemnation of the forcible acquisition of territory. We thus reconceptualize the territorial integrity norm to distinguish between general guarantees of territorial integrity and the rejection of force for acquiring territory.
We measure the evolving strength of the territorial integrity norm (in both the general and violent manifestations) over two centuries of history through treaty commitments, and then examine the impact of this norm on several forms of territorial conflict. Our results suggest that the norm has had a mixed impact, with general territorial integrity obligations reducing territorial conflict but violent obligations actually associated with increased conflict. There appears to be a stronger effect associated with global acceptance of territorial integrity obligations than with potential adversaries' shared obligations from specific treaties, and few individual territorial integrity treaties have had a significant effect on territorial conflict between signatories. We conclude by discussing possible directions for future research in this area.
Studying Territorial Integrity Norms
Our conceptualization of international norms follows Krasner's (1982: 186) definition as "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations." Like Florini (1996: 364-365) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) , we also emphasize "the sense of 'ought'" and the notion of legitimate behavior, which distinguish norms from observable behavioral regularities. A systematic analysis of a given norm must thus indicate which general class of behavior is addressed by the norm, which specific behaviors within this general class are considered legitimate, and why these behaviors are considered legitimate (rather than simply being observed empirically).
It is also important to be able to measure the strength of the norm over time, in order to examine its impact on states' behavior. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895-905) describe the strength of norms as evolving through a "life cycle" of three stages. In the norm emergence stage, norm entrepreneurs (typically private citizens, often with organizational platforms to help spread their message) attempt to convince state leaders to follow their desired norm. In the norm cascade stage, the "norm leaders" --states that have accepted the norm --attempt to socialize other states to accept the norm and become "norm followers." Some budding norms may fail in either the emergence or cascade stages, if the entrepreneurs or norm leaders are unable to convince enough states to follow them. Norms that pass through the first two stages reach the norm internalization stage, by the end of which "norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate." (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895) This notion of a life cycle encourages scholars to think in terms of the evolving strength of a norm over time, allowing systematic analysis of the impact of the norm on international behavior.
Working from insights such as these, a great deal of normative scholarship has emerged in the past two decades, offering systematic examination of norms pertaining to decolonization (Goertz and Diehl 1992) , alliance commitments (Kegley and Raymond 1990) , and pacific dispute settlement (e.g., Dixon 1993; Mitchell 2002) . Zacher (2001) has extended this list by suggesting that the past two centuries have seen the development of an important international norm against territorial changes. We now examine Zacher's characterization of this norm, before offering our own refinement of what the territorial integrity norm includes and how to measure it.
Zacher's Territorial Integrity Norm
According to Zacher (2001: 215) , the territorial integrity norm refers to "the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries." Zacher (2001: 216-221 ) describes this norm as developing out of the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century. Before that time, territories frequently changed hands with the expansion or contraction of states and empires, as rulers sought to acquire more land for the purposes of increasing their own security and/or wealth; the inhabitants of the territories were not considered during the process. As nationalism developed, though, a norm began to take shape that opposed transferring one state's people to rule by another state.
1 He later describes the spread of the norm as being driven by Western democracies and reflecting such factors as the association of territorial revisionism with major wars (most notably in the two world wars), liberalism's emphasis on national self-determination, and for nondemocratic states the changing costs and benefits of territorial aggrandizement (2001: 238-244) . Zacher (2001: 236) writes that the emergence phase of the territorial integrity norm began with the end of World War I, and lasted through the end of World War II. The norm began to take concrete form in the debate over the post-World War I peace settlement, and it was featured in one of Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points: "specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." The norm was first encapsulated in Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant:
"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 1 Ironically, this norm may have sown the seeds for irredentist claims. While the norm opposes transferring control of one's own kinsmen to a foreign power, it could also be manipulated to justify a territorial claim to territory populated by one's kinsmen under a foreign ruler. Zacher recognizes this, noting (2001: 244) that states' concerns for protecting their nationals abroad "cannot be squelched, but it is much more difficult now for states to embark on attempts to protect and absorb fellow nationals in foreign states when their civil rights are respected." there has not been a single major case of successful territorial aggrandizement.
Zacher's evidence appears persuasive initially, although his observation (2001: 224) that "the criteria for the inclusion of wars differs for the pre-and post-1945 years, and there is no claim of statistical significance" raises doubts. Further research seems warranted to assess the impact of this norm more systematically, employing more rigorous coding rules and standards of significance. In addition, we have several additional concerns with Zacher's approach that must be addressed before we can be confident in the impact of this norm. We are concerned with the identification of a single norm, when analysis of the relevant treaties and documents suggests two distinct norms related to territorial integrity --one preserving the territorial integrity of all states, and one rejecting the threat or use of force against territorial integrity but permitting peaceful territorial change. We also suggest that closer attention needs to be paid to the behavior that is studied to evaluate the impact of the norm(s) in question. While successful territorial aggrandizement should indeed count as evidence against a territorial integrity norm, we believe that the outbreak of armed conflict over territory (even if unsuccessful) should count as a violation of such a norm.
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Reconceptualizing Territorial Integrity Norms
We submit that instead of a single territorial integrity norm as described by Zacher, two distinct territorial integrity norms have been featured in multilateral treaties and institutions.
Some treaties have specifically proscribed the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of military force; this was Zacher's primary focus. Others encapsulate the notion of territorial integrity more generally, without any explicit limitation to the rejection of forcible changes in territory. Because these latter treaties do not explicitly limit the territorial integrity obligation to rejection of violent transfers of territory, they appear to be a broader and more comprehensive norm against territorial change, and they may be expected to have different consequences for international behavior.
The first multilateral treaty to contain an explicit territorial integrity obligation, the League of Nations Covenant, proscribed the violent acquisition of territory in Article 10: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Most other early efforts to encapsulate territorial integrity provisions in multilateral treaties followed similar approaches; details of each treaty are provided in this paper's Internet Appendix. Security Cooperation in contemporary Africa. In each case, the emphasis was on preventing war over territory, while still allowing peaceful transfers of territory by mutual agreement.
More recently, though, there has been a trend toward more general respect for territorial integrity provisions, with no explicit limitation to the proscription of violent acquisition of territory. The first such effort was the Locarno Pact (Pact of Mutual Guarantee) in interwar Europe, which sought to prevent Germany from challenging its western borders with France and
Belgium. In Article 1 of this pact, the signatory states guaranteed "the maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919." German demands for territory through the threat or use of force were clearly banned by this document, but so were peaceful demands for territorial revision; the pact was intended to prevent any challenge to the Versailles settlement in Western Europe.
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The Locarno Pact was the only such general territorial integrity obligation for more than three decades, until the decolonization of Africa in the 1960s. The borders between European colonies in Africa were often unnatural, cutting across traditional ethnic or linguistic groups and producing ill-fitting multiethnic colonial entities (Herbst 1989 Bell (1997: 36-37) notes that the Locarno Pact had great symbolic value in "confirming the territorial settlement in western Europe on a freely negotiated basis," and Gilbert (1984: 221-222) notes that in the eyes of the participants "the frontiers between Germany, France, and Belgium --and the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland --were now recognized as final." The importance of this pact's general rejection of territorial change becomes clear when it is compared ro several other pacts that were signed at Locarno; unlike the western borders, Germany refused to accept its post-Versailles eastern borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and would only agree that those borders could not be challenged militarily. 6 A number of African leaders argued in favor of this territorial integrity provision at the OAU's 1964 Cairo summit. For example, President Tsiranana of Madagascar declared that "It is no longer possible, nor desirable, to modify the boundaries of Nations, on the pretext of racial, religious, or linguistic criteria." Despite objections from Somalia and Morocco, the resolution passed easily after just forty minutes of discussion, and the OAU adhered rigidly to the principle of the territorial status quo in subsequent years. (Chime 1969: 67; Touval 1972: 86-90) 
Research Design
These hypotheses will be tested using two approaches. First, we will undertake an analysis of global patterns of territorial conflict since 1816. This approach, similar to Zacher's (2001) preliminary evaluation of the territorial integrity norm, will allow us to determine how much impact both violent and general territorial integrity obligations appear to have had on conflict over territory. We will supplement this with a more detailed analysis using data on specific pairs of potential adversaries, which will allow us to examine the impact of territorial integrity norms while controlling for other factors that seem likely to be relevant.
Global Impact of Territorial Integrity Norms
Our global analyses involve an examination of territorial conflict in the modern era, covering global history from 1816-2001 (the time span covered by the necessary data sets). The purpose is to determine whether the increasing strength of the territorial integrity norm(s) over time has been associated with a reduction in territorial conflict. This approach is similar to that used by Zacher (2001: 223-224) , who examined various historical periods to compare the number of territorial conflicts that occurred and the proportion of these conflicts that led to the redistribution of territory.
We seek to improve on Zacher's analyses in several ways. First, we offer multiple measures of the changing strength of territorial integrity norms over time, which we believe will allow a more accurate assessment of the norms' impact. We also examine this impact using multiple indicators of territorial conflict, ranging from low-level armed conflict over territory to the violent transfer of territory between nation-states. Finally, whereas Zacher (2001: 224) explicitly noted that he was making no claim about the statistical significance of his results, we seek to use statistical techniques to gain a more detailed understanding of the norm's impact.
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Measuring Territorial Integrity Norms
Zacher measured the strength of the global territorial integrity norm by identifying historical eras that appear to correspond to Finnemore and Sikkink's stages of norm development, primarily by reference to international treaties and documents that seemed to embody this norm. We believe that a more accurate measurement can be made with reference to the actual treaties themselves. That is, rather than identifying historical periods that seem to fit various stages of norm development, we measure the average number of territorial integrity obligations that each state has accepted in a given year. When the average state in the system has signed and ratified more treaties with formal territorial integrity obligations, we believe that the territorial integrity norm is stronger, as states have been willing to accept and be bound by more territorial integrity provisions.
This approach identifies variation in the norm's strength within each of the various stages of norm development that Zacher identified, and appears to offer a more accurate measure of the strength of the norm at any given point in time. For example, Zacher identifies the emergence phase of the norm as beginning with the League of Nations Charter, and running through the end of World War II. Yet the norm likely changed in strength over this time, as some states took on additional territorial integrity obligations, others abandoned previous obligations, and other states became independent without taking on any such obligations. Measuring the strength of the norm by specific treaty obligations allows us to determine how strong the norm was at any given point in time, based on the average obligations that each state in the international system had been willing to accept at that time.
[ Table 1 about here]
We have already described the differences between violent and general territorial integrity obligations, and presented a list of multilateral treaties encapsulating each type of obligation. Second, it is possible to accept the norm without signing any treaties that embody it;
indeed, if the norm were widely accepted throughout the world it would not need to be encapsulated in formal treaties. Furthermore, a state's commitment to the norm may strengthen over time after signing a given treaty, as the state's leaders and citizens internalize the norm or as other states or institutions push for the norm more vigorously. Conversely, a state's commitment to the norm may weaken over time after signing a treaty, as the state's leaders find that the norm conflicts with what they consider vital interests or as they observe other states violating the norm (although this weakening would be picked up by our measure if the weakening commitment led to the state's withdrawal from the treaty or institution in question).
With these caveats in mind, though, we submit that treaty commitments offer a reasonable measure of states' commitments to the territorial integrity norm, and that this measure is more accurate than delimiting historical periods when the norm was believed to have been stronger. We believe that (ceteris paribus) when states accept treaties that include explicit territorial integrity obligations, they typically do so because they have some level of support for the norm, and furthermore states that have signed and ratified more such treaties generally have more support for the norm than states that have less. Following Zacher, we also believe that such treaties do a reasonable job of capturing the development of the norm over time; Zacher dates the first explicit phase of the norm's development from the signing of the League of Nations Charter, and his discussion of the strengthening of the norm over time is based heavily on the signing of subsequent treaties. While there may have been states that accepted this norm without signing any relevant treaties, and other states that signed such treaties without accepting the norm, we believe that treaty obligations offer a better measure of the strength of the norm than any alternative (and by not measuring the strength of the norm by the presence or absence of the proscribed behavior, this measure allows systematic empirical analysis of the norm's impact). In any case, to ensure the fairest possible test of this norm's impact, our analyses will begin by using Zacher's historical periods (1816-1918, 1919-1945, 1946-1975, and 1976-2001) as an alternative measure of the strength of the norm before measuring it by territorial integrity obligations.
Dependent Variables
In testing the impact of the territorial integrity norm, it is important to specify exactly which types of behavior would constitute a violation of the norm. Zacher focused on successful territorial aggrandizement by force, which he measured by major territorial aggressions that led to the redistribution of territory. We focus on multiple forms of conflict over territory, recognizing that different treaty obligations specify different behaviors that are proscribed.
First, we are interested in the outbreak of armed conflict over territory. Unlike Zacher, we consider the threat or use of military force to be in opposition to the territorial integrity norm, because it represents the type of behavior that the norm seeks to prevent; we believe that a successful norm will prevent attempts to conquer or otherwise acquire territory by force, as well as preventing the success of such attempts when they are made. We measure this using version 3.02 of the Correlates of War (COW) militarized interstate dispute data set (Ghosn et al. 2004 ), using the status quo revision variables to determine whether at least one of the participants in a given dispute was attempting to modify the territorial status quo; we exclude all disputes where no disputant was attempting to do so. One potential objection to using this data set is that many militarized disputes only include isolated threats or border buildups that never escalate to more dangerous levels, and thus would not qualify as what Zacher (2001) called "territorial wars" or "major military conflicts." Our main analyses thus focus only on militarized disputes over territorial issues that led to at least one battlefield fatality, although we supplement these analyses with robustness checks using all disputes over territory as well as only those that produced at least 100 fatalities.
Following Zacher, we also recognize that the success of efforts to acquire territory is important. We thus include additional analyses examining the transfer of territory, as measured by the COW territorial change data set (Goertz and Diehl 1992) . We also distinguish between territorial changes that occur through peaceful means and those that occur through organized violence. Both violent and general territorial integrity obligations seek to prevent the violent transfer of territory, but violent obligations appear to allow the peaceful transfer of territory, making this an important distinction for analysis.
Dyadic Impact of Territorial Integrity Norms
The global analyses discussed so far have several important limitations. First, they are unable to determine whether the states that have accepted territorial integrity obligations at any given point in time are the ones that engage in any observed territorial conflict at that time.
Second, they are unable to control for the specific characteristics of states, which might promote or reduce the likelihood of territorial conflict at any given point in time. We thus supplement the analysis of global patterns with an analysis that considers all possible dyadic adversaries, or the different pairs of states that might become involved in territorial conflict.
These dyadic analyses require a population of cases that might reasonably be expected to become involved in territorial conflict. Rather than include hundreds of dyads such as Bolivia and Bangladesh that have no real prospect of conflict over any issue, much less over territory, we focus on two types of dyads: those composed of two states located in the same geographic region, and those composed of one major power and one other state in the international system.
Our data set includes a dyad-year-level observation for each year that both members of either type of dyad were independent nation-states, as identified by the COW interstate system membership list. 10 Our dyad-year-level analyses focus on only one of the dependent variables from the global analysis, fatal militarized conflict over territorial issues. The primary independent variables of interest are largely the same as in the global analyses: the historical development of the territorial integrity norm as described by Zacher, and the global average of both general and violent territorial integrity obligations in a given year. These are supplemented by measures of the number of territorial integrity obligations shared by the two states in the dyad, in order to determine whether or not the dyad's specific treaty commitments have a statistically discernible impact on conflict behavior.
Control Variables
In order to avoid exaggerating the impact of the territorial integrity norm, these analyses will control for the impact of other factors that might make affect the likelihood of armed conflict. In particular, we control for joint democracy and the adversaries' relative capabilities.
A variety of research suggests that armed conflict is less likely between two political democracies; joint democracy is measured with the Polity 4 data set, and indicates whether or not both claimants received scores of six or greater on the Polity index of institutionalized democracy. Our second control variable accounts for relative capabilities; if one state is substantially stronger than its opponent, then we might expect militarized conflict to be much less likely than would be the case between two relatively even adversaries, drawing from a variety of research indicating that relative parity is much more conflictual than preponderance by one side. Relative capabilities are measured using the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score from version 3.01 of the COW National Material Capabilities data set (Singer 1988), taking the challenger's CINC score as a percentage of the dyadic total. We also control for conflict history, using both the number of "peace years" since the most recent fatal territorial dispute in the dyads and using three splines, as suggested by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) .
Empirical Analyses
Global Impact of Territorial Integrity Norms
Our first analyses address the global impact of territorial integrity norms. Table 2 presents the results of a number of negative binomial regression analyses, using a variety of measures of territorial integrity norms to predict a variety of measures of armed conflict over territory.
11 In each analysis, the alpha parameter is positive and (in all but one case) statistically significant, indicating that a negative binomial model is more appropriate than a Poisson regression, which assumes that the value of alpha is zero. Each model controls for the number of states in the interstate system, which seems likely to increase the amount of conflict as the system has grown. Not surprisingly, this control variable has a positive effect (increasing conflict) in many of the models, although this effect is not always statistically significant.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 analyzes three different forms of challenges to the territorial status quo: fatal militarized disputes over territorial issues, violent territorial changes, and peaceful territorial changes. For each, the strength of the territorial integrity norm is measured by three different approaches: (1) a series of dummy variables indicating the three main phases in the development of the norm as described by Zacher, (2) the average number of total territorial integrity obligations (of all types) in the international system for each year of observation, and (3) the average number of both violent and general territorial integrity obligations for each year. The 11 The number of fatal militarized disputes over territorial issues ranges from zero to seven per year; the total number of disputes over territory (fatal or otherwise) ranges from zero to sixteen. The number of peaceful territorial changes ranges from zero to twenty per year, and violent territorial changes range from zero to fourteen.
results vary substantially across several of these analyses, indicating that the way the norm is conceptualized and measured can have a major impact on the results that are obtained.
We begin by discussing militarized disputes over territorial issues. Each of the stages in
Zacher's characterization of the development of the territorial integrity norm has a positive and statistically significant effect in Model I, indicating that more territorial conflict occurred during each of these eras (controlling for the number of states in the international system) than occurred in the 1816-1918 period before the norm was first encapsulated in written form. The largest substantive effect was for the 1946-1975 period and the smallest was for the 1976-2001 period, which suggests that territorial conflict has been somewhat less likely during the norm internalization phase than during the cascade stage, but fatal territorial conflict is still much more likely in each of these eras than it was before Zacher believes the norm began to develop.
We obtain similar results when measuring the strength of the territorial integrity norm by explicit treaty obligations in each year rather than by broad historical eras. The total treaty obligations measure in Model II has a significant and positive effect (p < .01), indicating that more fatal territorial conflict occurred in years when there were more territorial integrity treaty obligations in the international system (controlling for the size of the system). It is only in Model III, which distinguishes between violent and general territorial integrity treaty obligations, that we see the first reduction in territorial conflict that can be associated with the territorial integrity norm. In that model, higher average levels of violent territorial integrity obligations --those that explicitly prohibit the acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force, but make allowance for the peaceful transfer of territory --are still associated with greater levels of fatal territorial conflict (p < .05). However, higher levels of general territorial integrity obligations --those that seek to maintain the territorial status quo in its entirety --are associated with significantly less fatal conflict ( p < .01). This suggests that the specific type of territorial integrity obligation plays a very important role, and that general obligations to maintain the territorial status quo are much more effective at avoiding serious territorial conflict than are obligations to avoid the forceful acquisition of territory (which leave open the ability to seek revision through other means). 12
Turning to the exchange of territory through either violent or peaceful means in the remaining portions of Table 2 , the strength of the territorial integrity norm appears to have had much less of an impact. None of the historical phases in the development of the norm has seen significant increases or decreases in the frequency with which territory changes hands (controlling for system size). The total number of territorial integrity obligations in the system has had no systematic impact on violent territorial changes (p < . In each case, though, the territorial integrity norm has not had the expected effect of reducing armed conflict over territory. The best that can be said in these cases, except for the effect of general obligations in Table 2 as well as in each of these alternative analyses --is that the strength of the norm has made no systematic difference in the amount of territorial conflict. 13 If violent and peaceful territorial changes are combined, the only significant effects in any part of this table involve a reduction in territorial changes when there are higher levels of either violent (p < .001) or general (p < .001) territorial integrity obligations.
Together, these results suggest that the territorial integrity norm has had a surprisingly small effect on territorial conflict. The three phases in the development of the territorial integrity norm have all seen more armed conflict over territory than the period before the norm, and none has seen any reduction in the frequency of territorial changes. Measuring the strength of the norm based on explicit treaty obligations produces similar results, with higher levels of treaty obligations being associated with more armed conflict over territory but less peaceful territorial changes. Finally, violent territorial integrity obligations have been associated with more armed conflict but less peaceful changes, while only general territorial integrity obligations have been associated with less armed conflict, violent changes, and peaceful changes.
Of course, it is possible that these results can be explained by aggregation problems. Just because the average state has higher levels of explicit treaty obligations and the overall international system has higher levels of territorial conflict does not automatically imply that the states with the treaty obligations are those involved in the conflict, or that the treaty obligations are in any way causally associated with the conflict. We thus turn to a dyadic analysis of territorial conflict, in order to investigate whether pairs of states with higher levels of territorial integrity obligations have tended to experience less territorial conflict (as well as to control for the impact of other factors that are widely believed to be associated with armed conflict).
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 presents an analysis of the impact of territorial integrity norms on the territorial conflict behavior of individual dyads, rather than aggregating the conflict behavior of the entire international system into a single data point per year. Logistic regression is used, with the goal of modeling the likelihood that a fatal militarized dispute over territorial issues will begin during a particular dyad-year observation. Five models are presented, the first three of which correspond to the three models from Table 2A except for the addition of dyadic control variables --one with the three historical phases in the development of the territorial integrity norm as described by Zacher, and two with the average global territorial integrity treaty obligations. This table also adds two further models, though, replacing the global average treaty obligations with the number of shared territorial integrity obligations between the members of the dyad during each year of observation.
Dyadic Impact of Territorial Integrity Norms
The results of the first three models in Table 3 are consistent with the global analyses presented in Table 2A . Fatal territorial conflict is significantly more likely in each of the three phases of the norm's development than in the referent category of all years before 1919, when there are more territorial integrity obligations for the average state in the international system, and when there are more violent territorial integrity obligations; conflict is also significantly less likely when the average state has more general territorial integrity obligations. In short, considering dyadic-level control variables does not change the original results.
The final two models in this table suggest an important caveat. While the average level of territorial integrity obligations in the international system appears to have a systematic impact on conflict behavior (even if not always in the expected direction), states' interactions do not appear to be influenced in any systematic sense by their shared treaty commitments. Neither the total territorial integrity obligations shared by the two members of the dyad (p < .81) nor their disaggregated violent (p < .12) and general obligations (p < .24) has a systematic effect on the likelihood of fatal territorial conflict in the dyad. 14 The effect of the territorial integrity norm on a given state's interaction with a potential adversary, then, appears to depend more on pressure by outside states than on shared treaty commitments between the two potential adversaries themselves. This is largely consistent with parts of Zacher's argument, because of his emphasis on the global normative context rather than on individual states' treaty obligations. This is not the end of the story, though; it is important to consider several possible limitations of the analyses that have been presented so far. One such limitation involves the possibility that different treaties have had different effects, and the impact of shared treaty obligations on conflict behavior in Models IV and V of Table 3 has been weakened by including treaties that had systematically different effects. Another is the possibility that territorial integrity treaties reflect the international context in which the treaties are signed, rather than having any separate influence on states' behavior. The remaining analyses address these possibilities.
Context and Territorial Integrity Obligations
A potentially important challenge to the idea of a territorial integrity norm involves the context in which territorial integrity treaties are signed. If the norm is to have an independent effect, it must be able to influence states' behavior, leading them to do something that they otherwise would not have done or to avoid doing something that they otherwise would have done. A norm of territorial integrity would thus only have an independent effect on states'
behavior if it led them to avoid territorial conflict that they otherwise would have undertaken. If militarized disputes over territorial issues are used rather than only fatal disputes, the only difference is that the effect of total global obligations is not significant (p < .26). If only disputes with over 100 fatalities are considered, neither the 1976-2001 period (p < .13) nor total global obligations (p < .85) has a significant effect, while shared violent obligations (p < .001) and shared total obligations (p < .10) significantly decrease conflict and shared general obligations significantly increase it (p < .04).
states that otherwise would have had no interest in territorial conflict sign a territorial integrity treaty and subsequently do no engage in territorial conflict, it would be misleading to characterize the norm as successfully influencing states' actions.
It may be that states are only willing to accept territorial integrity obligations, whether of a general or violent nature, in situations of territorial stability. In such cases, the apparent obligation only reinforces what already exists, rather than adding important restrictions on states'
abilities to pursue their interests. The treaty obligations would appear to be associated with peace, but only because the states that are willing to accept such obligations are unlikely to become involved in territorial conflict with or without the treaty. Alternatively, it may be that territorial integrity treaties represent a desperate measure that is only attempted in the most dangerous situations, where states attempt to create institutions to manage grave threats to regional stability. In such cases, the apparent territorial integrity obligations might appear to have a positive relationship with conflict, which might be interpreted as showing that signing territorial integrity treaties actually "causes" an increase in territorial conflict, when the territorial threat itself actually spawned both the treaties and the subsequent conflicts.
[ Tables 4 and 5 about here] We consider this possibility --as well as the possibility, mentioned earlier, that there may be multiple types of effects of treaties, which may cancel each other out in aggregated analyses --with an additional series of analyses in Tables 4 and 5 . A separate analysis is run for each treaty, using the set of all possible dyads composed of two states that eventually accepted the treaty at the same time. Each dyad is included from the first year that both states in the dyad were members of the COW international system to the end of the period of study (2001) or the last year in which both states accepted the treaty; we do not have any systematic expectation for the aftermath of a treaty's termination or the aftermath of one state's withdrawal from a treaty. The key independent variables of interest in these analyses are a dummy variable indicating the last decade of relations before the treaty took effect for the dyad, which will be used to investigate the effect of changing relations before the treaty, and a dummy variable indicating all years when the treaty was in effect for the dyad. The referent category for these two variables is the set of all years more than a decade before the treaty took effect. Table 4 presents the results for two of the 22 treaties for which analyses were run; the results for all 22 treaties are summarized in Table 5 . The control variables in each model generally produced the same effects as in the aggregated analyses presented in Table 3 . For the League of Nations, a violent territorial integrity obligation, fatal territorial conflict was significantly more likely in the last decade before the treaty took effect for each dyad (p < .01), as well as in the years when the treaty was in effect for each dyad (p < .001). For the NonAligned Movement, a general territorial integrity obligation, fatal territorial conflict was significantly less likely in the decade before the treaty took effect (p < .02), but there has been no systematic effect on territorial conflict while the treaty was in effect (p < .44).
Considering the summary of results presented in Table 5 , several findings become apparent. First, most of these territorial integrity obligations began --or took effect --in times when territorial conflict was already being reduced or ended. Four of the 22 treaties followed decades where fatal territorial conflict was already significantly less likely than it had been in earlier years, and another ten followed decades where no such conflict occurred between any eventual members. Only two --the League of Nations and the Andean Community --came into force following decades where territorial conflict among the members was significantly more likely than it had been in earlier years. The remaining six treaties followed decades where at least one fatal territorial dispute occurred, but the likelihood of such conflict was not systematically different from earlier years. Fourteen of 22 treaties thus followed decades with either no territorial conflict or a significantly reduced likelihood of such conflict, and only two came out of contexts where conflict was more likely than it had been in earlier years. This suggests that there may be some sort of selection effect in the choice to begin territorial integrity obligations, and that they generally are not attempted in contexts with substantial conflict.
Addressing the origins of these obligations lies beyond the scope of the present paper, but it appears to be an important topic for future research.
The other important result from Table 5 is the general lack of systematic effects of the various treaties included in this study. Only two of the 22 treaties have had a statistically significant impact on conflict behavior while they were in force: fatal territorial conflict was more likely while the League of Nations was in effect (p < .001), and less likely while SAARC has been in effect (p < .001). Six other treaties have not witnessed a single fatal territorial conflict while in effect, but only three of these (the Montevideo Convention, ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States) were in effect for at least a decade before the end of the period of study; the other three took effect during the last two years of the study, leaving too little time for us to be confident in their effects.
Rather than the results in Table 3 being weakened by several opposite effects canceling each other out, it appears that the reason for the lack of effect of shared treaty obligations is the general lack of effect of the treaties in question.
Discussion
Taken together, this study's analyses suggest a clearer picture of the impact of the territorial integrity norm. First, there have been two distinct territorial integrity norms in recent history, one that proscribes the acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force and one that seeks to preserve territorial integrity more generally. Both norms are becoming increasingly widespread across the globe, but their effects on territorial conflict appear to be mixed. Violent territorial integrity obligations --which have been far more common than general obligations, at least until the last few decades of the twentieth century --have had little systematic impact, and indeed seem to be associated with greater territorial conflict in some of our analyses. In contrast, general territorial integrity obligations have been associated with a significant decrease in numerous measures of territorial conflict.
Further investigation suggests that the greatest impact of the norm stems from pressure by other states in the international system that have accepted the norm, rather than from any direct effect of the norm on interactions between states that share obligations under the same treaty. Shared territorial integrity treaty obligations --whether involving violent, general, or total obligations --have not had a systematic impact on territorial conflict, and few individual treaties have had a significant effect on territorial conflict between members while the treaties have been in force. Most of the treaties were created in periods of reduced or no territorial conflict among the eventual signatories, though, suggesting a strong likelihood of a selection effect for individual treaties.
One important contribution of this study has been the systematic evaluation of an important international norm. While the increasing frequency of treaties incorporating explicit territorial integrity provisions has been interpreted as indicating a global spread of acceptance of a territorial integrity norm, the impact of this apparent norm has never been subjected to rigorous empirical analysis. This study's analyses reveal that territorial integrity norms do not seem to have been nearly as effective at avoiding challenges to the territorial status quo or reducing armed conflict as some have argued. While general territorial integrity obligations appear to have been associated with a reduction in territorial conflict, violent territorial integrity obligations --which have historically been much more frequent than general obligations --have had the opposite effect.
This is not the final word on the impact of these norms, though. While this study has examined the norm's effect on armed armed conflict over territory, which was also the focus of Further research should help to determine which of these varied characterizations is most accurate, which would greatly increase our understanding of the sources and management of territorial conflict in the modern era. • Point IV -Territorial integrity of states: "The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force. The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal."
• But also note Point I -Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty: "[all the participating States] consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement." (1976-present) • Article 2: "In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles... a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations" • Article 10: "Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a treat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party." (1985-present) • Article II: "1. Cooperation within the framework of the Association shall be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, noninterference in the internal affairs of other States and mutual benefit."
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
Andean Community (1989-present) • Article 12 of Declaration of Galápagos: "The Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela... Agree in the following declaration to... 2. Reaffirm their commitment to secure peace and cooperation in the Subregion and observe in their relations the principles on the prohibition of the use or threat of force, on the pacific settlement of conflicts, respect for national sovereignty, and compliance with the obligations arising from international legal instruments, as well as to abstain from actions against the territorial integrity, political independence, or unity of any of the states." (1991-present) • Article 3 of CIS Charter: "For the achievement of the Commonwealth's objectives, the Member States shall, proceeding from the universally recognized norms of international law and the Helsinki Final Act, organize their relationships in accordance with the following interconnected principles of equal value: (...) --inviolability of state borders, recognition of existing borders, and rejection of unlawful territorial acquisitions; --territorial integrity of states and rejection of any actions aimed at dismembering another state's territory" (1999-present) • Article III of Declaration of the Principles Guiding Relations among the CICA Member States: "The Member States shall respect the territorial integrity of each other. They recognize the inviolability of state boundaries and therefore they shall refrain at present and in the future from any attempt to violate these boundaries. The Member States shall likewise refrain from making each other's territory the subject of military occupation or other direct or indirect use of force in contravention of international law, or an object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of their implementation. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legitimate." (2001-present) • "Principles of GUUAM Cooperation" in Yalta GUUAM Charter: "Cooperation within the GUUAM is based on the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, in particular, on the respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs of the Member States."
Commonwealth of Independent States
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
GUUAM/GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
South-East European Cooperation Process (2000-present)
• "Scope and Principles of the Regional Cooperation" in Bucharest Charter: " The cooperation among our countries shall be founded on the UN Charter, on the principle of full observance of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the states in our region, on the principles of the OSCE and the relevant documents of the Council of Europe..."
• "Objectives and Mechanisms of Cooperation" in Bucharest Charter: " Our political and security cooperation serving this purpose shall be focused on: --Creating peaceful and good-neighborly relations in the region through reconciliation, recognition of the inviolability of the existing international borders and the peaceful resolution of disputes, on the basis of international law..." (2001-present) • Article 5 of the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO: "The States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization firmly adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, equal rights and mutual advantage, resolution of all issues through joint consultations, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use or threat of use of military force, and renunciation of unilateral military advantage in contiguous areas."
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Collective Security Treaty Organization (2003-present) • Preamble of CSTO Charter: "Seeking to establish favorable and stable conditions for the full development of the States Parties to the Treaty and to ensure their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity..."
• Article 3 of CSTO Charter: "The purposes of the Organization are to strengthen peace and international and regional security and stability and to ensure the collective defense of the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member States..."
ECCAS Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual Security Pact in Central Africa
